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NJ Facing the problem of evilVisual, verbal and mental images of (in)humanity
Claudia Welz
Abstract • This article explores imagination as a means of ethical re-orientation in the aftermath of 
atrocity. The discussion of the problem of evil is based on Hannah Arendt’s critique of Kant and her 
notion of ‘rootless’ rather than ‘radical’ evil. On this basis, the orienting potential of visual images is 
investi gated with regard to images of violence in the media on the one hand, and, on the other, with regard 
to Michelangelo’s Creation of Adam. Then the role of verbal and mental images of humanity or inhumanity 
is discussed with reference to the Holocaust survivor Jorge Semprun’s testimony in his book Literature or 
Life. Finally, the biblical motif of the human being created in the image of an invisible God, the imago Dei, 
comes into view as an exemplary image of humanity that appears in a framework of interpretation where 
the invisible is mediated with the help of verbal, visual and/or mental images.
Radical vs. rootless evil: from Kant to Arendt
In Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen 
Vernunft (Religion within the Boundaries of 
Mere Reason, 1793), Part One, Immanuel Kant 
famously outlines what he calls ‘radical evil in 
human nature’, understood as the indwelling 
(Einwohnung) of an evil principle alongside 
the good (1990: 17–58; 1998: 45–73). Accord-
ing to Kant, the good is identical with the good 
will of a person, while the propensity to evil in 
human nature is the frailty in not choosing the 
good. The latter is also described as the impur-
ity, depravity or perversity of the human heart 
(cf. Kant 1998: 52–4). Kant here inherits the 
Lutheran tradition of sin corrupting human-
kind; yet, in contrast to the pessimistic assump-
tion of a servum arbitrium that is not capable of 
anything good when human beings act on their 
own terms, Kant presupposes that we have the 
freedom to choose the good. In his view, the two 
competing principles of good and evil in human 
nature become enacted via our choices. Thus, 
evil is not interpreted as a metaphysical problem 
of privatio boni, a lack of the good, but rather as 
an ethical issue, as something for which some-
one is responsible. Evil, then, is not radical in 
the sense that it is inescapably rooted in human 
nature, having its radix or root in our heart. 
Instead, it can only be ascribed to a person who 
has in actual fact chosen that which is not good.
Kant writes explicitly that the ‘propensity 
to evil in human nature’ can be thought of as 
‘brought by the human being upon himself ’ (Kant 
1998: 52f., italics in the original). As Andrew 
Benjamin (2016: 105) has pointed out, the 
problem of evil is in this setting framed as ‘the 
presence of evil’ – understood both as its ‘actual-
ity’ and its ‘possibility’, since evil neither can be 
1 This is the revised version of a lecture given  
at the workshop and PhD course ‘The Prob-
lem of Evil and Images of (In)Humanity’ at 
the University of Copenhagen on 7 October 
2016. I am grateful for extremely helpful 
comments by two anonymous reviewers.
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mere contingency nor a result of evil nature; 
instead, Kant moves ‘from an originating arché 
that is static to the presence of an origin as an 
already present potentiality’. This potential-
ity indicates human freedom of choice. Insofar 
as one can put self-love above concern for the 
general good as the maxim of one’s will, one is 
evil in Kant’s eyes, and this implies that evil, for 
him, ‘is not a matter of wicked intentions, but of 
misordered priorities’ (Geddes 2013: 222).
In her New York lecture course ‘Some Ques-
tions of Moral Philosophy’ (1965–6), Hannah 
Arendt comments on Kant by underlining that 
he regarded moral knowledge, the knowledge of 
right and wrong, as a matter of course, not moral 
conduct:
Because inclinations and temptation are 
rooted in human nature, though not in 
human reason, Kant called the fact that man 
is tempted to do wrong by following his 
inclinations ‘radical evil.’ Neither he nor any 
other moral philosopher actually believed 
that man could will evil for its own sake; 
all transgressions are explained by Kant as 
exceptions that a man is tempted to make 
from a law which he otherwise recognizes as 
being valid … No one wants to be wicked, and 
those who nevertheless act wickedly fall into 
an absurdum morale – into moral absurdity. He 
who does this is actually in contradiction with 
himself, his own reason. (Arendt 2003: 62; see 
Bernstein 2002 on Arendt and Kant)
Given that knowing the good does not 
automatically lead to doing the good, although 
no-one can regard evil as a goal in itself, the 
question is: what hinders human beings in 
willing and realizing the good? Arendt refers 
to inclinations that can tempt us to will what 
is wrong and to act wickedly; yet in this case, 
self-contradiction is ensuing from doing the 
opposite of what reason prescribes us to do. 
As it is not just irrational, but also painful to 
contradict oneself in this way, everyone is inter-
ested in avoiding dissonance with oneself: ‘it is 
better to be at odds with the whole world than, 
being one, to be at odds with myself ’ (Arendt 
2003: 100). Thus, owing to the risk of self- 
contradiction or even self-division, there is a 
strong motivation to resist the temptation to do 
evil. 
How, then, is it possible at all that human 
beings commit crimes against humanity, the 
utter culmination of evil? Let us listen to the 
statements of a contemporary war criminal. The 
German weekly Die Zeit printed a thought- 
provoking interview with Radovan Karadžić, 
who in March 2016 was sentenced to 40 years’ 
imprisonment by the International Criminal 
Court in The Hague for crimes against human-
ity, war crimes and genocide. During the mas-
sacre of Srebrenica, about 8000 Muslims were 
killed, and the Serbian siege of Sarajevo ended 
with Serbs shooting starving civilians. Here is 
an excerpt from the interview:
Die Zeit: Was macht für Sie einen bösen 
Menschen aus?
Karadžić: Einen bösen Menschen gibt es 
nicht. Es gibt Menschen, die dermaßen 
unglückselig und so unglücklich sind, dass 
sie ihren Kompass verloren haben und sich 
für schlechte Elemente des menschlichen 
Wesens entscheiden. Sie haben Denk- und 
Ver haltens weisen übernommen, die schädlich 
sind, zunächst einmal für die Personen selbst 
und dann auch für ihr Umfeld. Keine glück-
liche Person kann böse sein. …
Radovan Karadžić ist unfähig oder nicht willens, 
einen Anflug von Reue zu zeigen. Vielleicht emp-
findet er sie nicht einmal. Im Gefängnis hat er 
sich seine eigene Gedankenwelt geschaffen, ange-
füllt mit Selbstbetrug und Verschwörungstheorien, 
die abgeschlossene Welt eines Unbelehrbaren. …
Die Zeit: Wie soll die Welt Sie in Erinnerung 
behalten?
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Karadžić: Ich weiß, dass die serbische Welt 
mich als einen aufopfernden und verant-
wortungsbewussten Staatsdiener in Erin-
nerung behalten wird. (Willeke 2016: 12, 
italics in the original)
To sum up: According to Karadžić, there 
are no evil human beings in this world, but only 
unhappy people who have lost their moral com-
pass and therefore have chosen bad elements of 
human nature: ways of thinking and behaving 
that are harmful for themselves and their sur-
roundings. The thought that a happy person 
cannot be evil excuses all evil-doers as poor devils 
who have no luck and get no joy. Revealingly, 
Karadžić shows no remorse whatsoever. When 
asked how the world will remember him, he 
replies that he knows that the Serbian world 
will treasure his memory as a self-sacrificing and 
responsible public servant.
Arendt, by contrast, does not accept unhap-
piness as an excuse for immorality. She ven-
tures the following assumption regarding how 
a human being can come so far as to commit 
crimes against humanity that deny others’ 
dignity:
Philosophy (and also great literature …) 
knows the villain only as somebody who is 
in despair and whose despair sheds a certain 
nobility about him. I am not going to deny 
that this type of evildoer exists, but I am 
certain that the greatest evils we know of are 
not due to him who has to face himself again 
and whose curse is that he cannot forget. The 
greatest evildoers are those who don’t remem-
ber because they have never given thought to 
the matter, and, without remembrance, noth-
ing can hold them back. For human beings, 
thinking of past matters means moving in the 
dimension of depth, striking roots and thus 
stabilizing themselves, so as not to be swept 
away by whatever may occur – the Zeitgeist 
or History or simple temptation. The greatest 
evil is not radical, it has no roots, and because 
it has no roots it has no limitations, it can go 
to unthinkable extremes and sweep over the 
whole world. (Arendt 2003: 94f.)
While the monologues of the scoun-
drels in world literature from Shakespeare to 
Dostoevsky testify to the fact that they experi-
enced the depth of despair, the Nazi crimin-
als in the twentieth century were apparently 
too superficial and shallow, too forgetful and 
thoughtless to reflect upon what they had done 
and despair about it. Pondering the past means 
being rooted in history and contemplating the 
consequences of one’s deeds. Considering the 
evil that led to the Shoah, Arendt discards 
Kant’s notion of radical evil – both in regard 
to its being grounded in human nature and its 
historicity. The planning of industrialised geno-
cide required an extraordin ary measure of self- 
evasion and the deliberate loss of memory. 
Since it was rootless, this evil was also limitless. 
It could spread because it was not stopped by 
any scruples. There was no second thought, no 
regret, no self-criticism on the side of those who 
were deemed responsible for the crimes.
The connection between thinking and 
remembering as ‘the human way of strik-
ing roots, of taking one’s place in the world’ 
(Arendt 2003: 100) has a flipside: where these 
‘self-grown roots’ (ibid. 101) are absent, one no 
longer sets oneself limits: ‘If I refuse to remem-
ber, I am actually ready to do anything’ (ibid. 94). 
Irresponsibility, then, is due to a peculiar kind of 
self-forgetfulness: one ignores the link between 
one’s doing and one’s being, between personal 
agency and personal identity. Thus ‘the safest 
way for the criminal never to be detected and to 
escape punishment is to forget what he did, and 
not to think about it any more’ (ibid.), whereas 
the one who repents returns to his deeds in 
thought. Similarly, in Beyond Good and Evil 
(1886), Friedrich Nietzsche formulates a bless-
ing of the forgetful by imitating and yet reversing 
Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies  |  Vol. 29, No. 1 65
Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount: ‘Blessed are the 
forgetful, for they shall also “be done with” their 
blunders’ (2008: no. 217). Note that this is not 
an innocent or distrait forgetfulness, but rather 
one that is tied to self-deception. It is not a coin-
cidence that Arendt (2003: 124) also quotes the 
following aphorism by Nietzsche: ‘My memory 
tells me: I did this. My pride replies: I could not 
have done it. Pride is unrelenting. Finally my 
memory gives in’ (Nietzsche 2008: no. 68). Here 
repression is part and parcel of the process in 
which unwelcome self-knowledge is rejected.
Having witnessed the Eichmann trial in 
Jeru salem in 1961, Arendt was stunned by the 
fact that this man – one of the key perpetrators 
of the Holocaust – did not feel he was caught 
in any ethical dilemma. Eichmann claimed to 
have a clear conscience. Her explanation is that 
his conscience spoke ‘with the voice of respect-
able society around him’ (Arendt 2006: 126). 
Without further ado, Eichmann conformed to 
his social environment, legal authorities and 
Hitler’s words. He understood himself as a 
law-abiding citizen. In Eichmann’s case, it was 
impossible ‘to trace the uncontestable evil of his 
deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives. 
The deeds were monstrous, but the doer … 
was quite ordinary, commonplace, and nei-
ther demonic nor monstrous’, she explained in 
The Life of the Mind (Arendt 1978: 4). Arendt 
expected to meet a monster, but instead ‘she 
found an efficient bureaucrat who routinely sent 
thousands to their deaths and considered it a 
day’s work’ (Geddes 2009: 123). Arendt termed 
this widespread everydayness and routinisation 
of evil-doing the ‘banality’ of evil (cf. Benhabib 
1990: 185). ‘The trouble with Eichmann was 
precisely that so many were like him, and that 
the many were neither perverted nor sadistic’, 
but ‘terribly and terrifyingly normal’ (Arendt 
2006: 287).
This normality was so terrifying for Arendt 
because it implies that many people can commit 
crimes without knowing or feeling that they are 
doing wrong. In the courtroom, Arendt became 
aware of Eichmann’s incapability ‘of uttering a 
single sentence that was not a cliché’ (Arendt 
2006: 48) and his incapability of changing per-
spectives by putting himself in another’s place: 
‘The longer one listened to him, the more obvi-
ous it became that his inability to speak was 
closely connected with an inability to think, 
namely, to think from the standpoint of some-
body else’ (ibid. 49). Robert Eaglestone (2017: 
34) calls attention to the fact that, for Arendt, 
real communication with others and oneself 
opens up the reality of the world; conversely, 
the language of Nazism, of cliché, slogans, 
stock phrases and evasion, ‘is the vector through 
which ideology destroys or recasts experience 
and prevents thought’. Eichmann’s inability to 
think entails the ‘lack of a dialogic interrogation 
of a position’ (ibid. 35), in particular the lack of 
self-critical thinking. 
Moreover, in claiming only to be a small 
cog in the machine of a regime, one shuffles off 
one’s own responsibility and renounces one’s 
personality, thus becoming an evasive ‘nobody’ 
(cf. Eaglestone 2017: 65, 67). If one refuses to 
take upon oneself the responsibility for what one 
does and for who one becomes through acting 
like this, one voluntarily places down one’s per-
sonal qualities, ‘as if nobody were left to be either 
punished or forgiven’ – which is, in Arendt’s 
view, the problem with Nazi criminals who ‘pro-
tested time and again that they had never done 
anything out of their own initiative … and that 
they only obeyed orders. To put it another way: 
the greatest evil perpetrated is the evil commit-
ted by nobodies, that is, by human beings who 
refuse to be persons’ (Arendt 2003: 111). The 
impersonality of evil implicates another prob-
lem: indifference. 
People who look away do not stop the crime 
but join in it: through Weggucken and Mitmachen, 
one tolerates evil, to say the least, or even causes 
it (Augstein 2010: 179). This is illustrated by 
the open letter that Shmuel Zygelboym, the 
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representative of the Jewish people of Poland, 
sent via the New York Times on 4 June 1943. 
The letter begins as follows: ‘I take the liberty 
of addressing to you my last words and through 
you the Polish government and people of the 
Allied States and the conscience of the world’ 
(Zygelboym 1995: 683). He informed the 
world about the failed uprising in the Warsaw 
Ghetto and the deportation and extermination 
of Jewish people, and he protested against the 
‘inactivity with which the world is looking on’ 
and permitting the crime to continue, thereby 
becoming ‘accomplices of criminals’ when pas-
sively observing the ‘murder of defenseless 
millions and the maltreatment of children and 
women’ (ibid.). Today one could say something 
similar about the tragedy in Syria. What have 
we learned from history, if anything? And how, 
if at all, can we guard ourselves against repetitive 
vari ations of historical catastrophes? 
Thinking as a cure for the ‘banality’ of evil?  
A critical appraisal of Arendt’s approach
Given that evil-doing cannot always be traced 
back to a wicked heart, but often to mere 
thoughtlessness, a possible cure for the ‘banal-
ity’ of evil would be Nachdenken, thinking about 
one’s deeds, relationships and events happening. 
Correspondingly, in The Life of the Mind, Arendt 
(1978: 13) states (1) that ‘absence of thought is 
not stupidity; it can be found in highly intelli-
gent people’; and (2) that ‘a wicked heart is not 
its cause; it is probably the other way round, 
that wickedness may be caused by absence of 
thought’. The latter is said in explicit opposition 
to a phrase of Kant’s.
As Arne Johan Vetlesen rightly remarks, 
‘Arendt, the thinker, never obtained the thought 
that thinking … could lead to evil’ (2001: 9). 
Franziska Augstein (2010: 184f.), too, criticizes 
Arendt’s naivety in relying on the formal pro-
cedures of a lawsuit, while losing sight of the 
truism that any accused perpetrator lies as well 
and as much as he can. Arendt did not know 
the transcriptions of Eichmann’s conversations 
with SS-officer Willem Sassen, which prove 
that his antisemitic attitude guided his actions 
with the aim of killing as many Jews as pos-
sible. Eichmann insisted that he was not a nor-
mal recipient of orders; otherwise he would – 
in his own eyes – have been stupid. Rather, he 
saw himself as an ‘idealist’ who was thinking for 
himself (Augstein 2010: 184f., with reference to 
Wojak 2001: 63, 195, 200). By contrast, Arendt 
was duped into believing that there was no sign 
in Eichmann ‘of firm ideological convictions 
or of specific evil motives’ (1978: 4). While she 
did not assume that thinking could produce the 
good deed as its result, she raised the question of 
whether our faculty for telling right from wrong 
might be connected with our faculty of thought: 
‘Could the activity of thinking as such, the 
habit of examining whatever happens to come 
to pass or to attract attention … be among the 
con ditions that make men abstain from evil-do-
ing or even actually “condition” them against 
it?’ (ibid. 5) In her view, the word ‘con-science’ 
points in this direction insofar as it means ‘to 
know with and by myself ’ and thus conveys 
knowledge ‘that is actualized in every thinking 
process’ (ibid.). 
On the one hand, Arendt mistrusted Eich-
mann’s ‘good conscience’ because as a rule, a 
‘good conscience’ is enjoyed ‘only by really bad 
people’, while only ‘good people’ are ‘cap able 
of having a bad conscience’ (Arendt 1978: 5). 
On the other hand, Arendt did not discover 
how much Eichmann was entangled in Nazi 
ideology – not only as a victim of propaganda, 
a poor party hack, but also as an active abuser 
of language who wanted to manipulate reality 
and as a moral offender who ascribed to himself 
the responsibility for what he did. I agree with 
Hans-Jørgen Schanz (2007: 97) that Arendt’s 
theory of totalitarianism is too narrowly con-
sidered insofar as a totalitarian system would 
not work without some key persons such as 
Nordisk judaistik • Scandinavian Jewish Studies  |  Vol. 29, No. 1 67
Hitler, Himmler or Stalin, who cannot be said 
to be ‘thoughtless’ in the sense that this word has 
acquired for Arendt. These key persons were not 
just anonymous functionaries, but enormously 
powerful, visible and active leaders who knew 
exactly what they wanted. Arendt, who at all 
costs wished to avoid demonising the Eichmann 
type of evil, achieved an effect that was contrary 
to her own intentions: the ‘banality’ of evil was 
by many people misinterpreted as its alleged 
harmlessness (cf. ibid. 84).
In fact, it was not she, but Karl Jaspers who 
brought up this term in a letter to Arendt, dated 
19 October 1946, where he voiced a certain dis-
agreement about the question of guilt: 
You say that what the Nazis did cannot be 
comprehended as ‘crime’ – I’m not altogether 
comfortable with your view, because a guilt 
that goes beyond all criminal guilt inevitably 
takes on a streak of ‘greatness’ – of satanic 
greatness – which is, for me, as inappropri-
ate for the Nazis as all the talk about the 
‘demonic’ element in Hitler and so forth. It 
seems to me that we have to see these things 
in their total banality, in their prosaic triviality, 
because that’s what truly characterizes them. 
Bacteria can cause epidemics that wipe out 
nations, but they remain merely bacteria. … 
There is no idea and no essence here.  
( Jaspers 1992: 62, letter no. 46)
Interestingly, Arendt not only took up the 
term of the ‘banality’ of evil, but also its descrip-
tion with the help of biological metaphors. Many 
years later, in a letter to Gershom Scholem from 
24 July 1963, Arendt admitted that she changed 
her mind and no longer, like Kant, spoke of 
‘radical evil’:
It is indeed my opinion now that evil is never 
‘radical’, that it is only extreme, and that it 
possesses neither depth nor any demonic 
dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the 
whole world precisely because it spreads like a 
fungus on the surface. It is ‘thought-defying’, 
as I said, because thought tries to reach some 
depth, to go to the roots, and the moment 
it concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated 
because there is nothing. That is its ‘banality’. 
Only the good has depth and can be radical. 
(Arendt 2007: 471)
The idea of rootless evil that spreads like 
rapidly reproducing micro-organisms prevails 
also in ‘Some Questions of Moral Philosophy’, 
where Arendt writes that ‘The greatest evil is not 
radical, it has no roots’ but ‘can go to unthink-
able extremes and sweep over the whole world’ 
(Arendt 2003: 95). 
According to Susan Neiman (2002: 301), 
Arendt’s use of naturalist, non-intentional 
vocabulary for evil that is compared to a fun-
gus and claimed to be banal was Arendt’s most 
significant break with Kant’s work. While 
great temptations can easily be recognised and 
resisted, contemporary dangers begin with triv-
ial and insidious steps. ‘Calling evil banal is a 
piece of moral rhetoric, a way of defusing the 
power that makes forbidden fruit attractive’ 
(ibid. 302). Instead of aestheticising evil, thus 
turning it into an object of fascination, Arendt 
took an ironic tone toward Eichmann, which 
created ‘distance in place of desire’ and limited its 
appeal (ibid.). To deny that supernatural forces, 
divine or demonic, are required to account for 
evil, makes evil comprehensible – at least to 
some extent; yet, I doubt that Arendt wanted to 
offer ‘a theodicy’, as Neiman has it, which would 
imply that the sources of evil are ‘fully within 
our grasp’ (ibid. 303). After all, Arendt does not 
offer a rational defence of God in the face of 
evil, nor does she design an ‘anthropodicy’ or 
‘cosmodicy’ that would justify the righteousness 
(dikê) of the human being (ánthropos) or the 
world (kósmos); and simple efforts to continue 
to believe in humanity or the world despite evil 
do not deserve the nomenclature ‘theodicies’. 
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Furthermore, the shallowness of rootless evil 
that devastates reality by laying waste its surface 
is by no means a consolation in the sense that 
the world would still be intact at depth; rather, it 
is infected everywhere.
In my view, Arendt’s metaphors visualise the 
vastness of an evil that cannot be controlled by 
the single individual any more. In order to com-
prehend and control it, a change of the whole 
system would be required: the transformation of 
the mindset of a whole nation. Also, we have to 
take seriously the point where Arendt’s vocabu-
lary falls short and cannot meaningfully be 
applied to human beings: unlike the thought-
lessness of bacteria or a fungus, human thought-
lessness is willed. While no-one intentionally 
deceives him- or herself, everyone is obliged by 
his or her self-knowledge; verbose self-defences 
such as, for instance, the claim that one has only 
internalised others’ norms, are voluntary and 
show, paradoxically, that one already has become 
responsible for the appropriation of these norms 
(see Welz 2018: 247).
We have to keep in mind that Arendt’s cri-
tique of thoughtlessness addresses, first of all, 
thinking in the sense of ‘wondering’ and ‘pon-
dering’; this differs from cognitive activities in 
which we fully expect an answer to the prob-
lems we are dealing with, for instance when cal-
culating or strategising (see Pack 2017: 153f.). 
Eichmann’s rationality was ‘the restricted one 
of instrumental reason’ suited to practical-tech-
nic al tasks such as organising the most efficient 
means to attain a given end, instead of ques-
tioning that end; yet, Arendt might also have 
inquired into the lack of empathy rather than 
the lack of thinking (Vetlesen 2001: 9). 
The fatal self-understanding of Eichmann 
and Karadžić, which is characterised by deficient 
insight into the weight of the crimes each of 
them committed, brings us directly to the next 
question: what images of (in)humanity can yield 
navigational tools and norms of orientation?
The role of visual images of inhumanity
In exploring the power of visual images, let us 
first pick out counter-images through which we 
can orient ourselves only via negativa – through 
turning away from them. Images that portray 
inhumanity do not function as a model. The 
media are filled with images of dread: images of 
terror attacks, shooting rampages and decapita-
tions.
In an article with the programmatic title 
‘Ansage: Ich will das nicht mehr sehen’, Felix 
Dachsel (2016: 56) asks: ‘Why am I watching 
this?’ – ‘What does a human being, who films 
injured persons instead of helping them, think? 
And what do I feel when I look at this?’ He 
argues that the hope of taming the horror con-
nects us, as if a community of onlookers could 
prevent another disaster. Since the idea of evil 
is traditionally tied to darkness, we believe we 
can chase away the horrendous by being vigi-
lant. Yet terrorists attack us exactly because we 
circulate the documents that testify to their mis-
deeds. For Dachsel, terrorism is an act of exhib-
itionism. While he thought he could control the 
images he saw, they have taken control of him 
in his nightmares. The images of the injured 
impose themselves. Horror sometimes impedes 
understanding. Maybe, Dachsel deliberates, we 
should rediscover an old feeling: shame. In times 
of relentless immediacy, shame could bestow us 
with sensibility for the question of when we 
are allowed to look closely and when we rather 
should avert our eyes. After all, we are ashamed 
of what human beings can do to each other. 
Dachsel concludes that looking away, too, can 
be an expression of compassion (cf. ibid.).2
2 My translation and summarising paraphrase. 
Here is the German original (Dachsel 2016: 
56): ‘Diese Bilder. Ich hatte schon viele 
solcher Bilder gesehen, meistens saß ich auf 
meinem Sessel: Amokläufe, Terroranschläge, 
Massaker. Jetzt frage ich mich zum ersten 
Mal: Warum schaue ich mir das an? … Man 
zückt das Smartphone, wenn es knallt. Als 
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As Dachsel has clarified from the very start, 
looking away is not an alternative to checking 
and helping the ones in need. Looking away is 
alright when it is clear that one cannot do any-
thing to help others but would only be a pas-
sive onlooker if one gazed at them. Here the 
viewer empathises with the victims and puts 
him- or herself in others’ shoes. Once the viewer 
sees things also from another’s perspective, he/
she can decide to protect the other’s dignity by 
looking down. This kind of shame, the shame of 
discretion and decency (see Welz 2011), is the 
exact opposite to the exhibitionism of the ter-
rorists who showcase atrocities.
While images of inhumanity, which combine 
the ‘inhuman’ cruelty of the perpetrators and the 
‘inhuman’ humiliation of the victims, can evoke 
empathy with the ones who suffer, they also 
have a repelling effect. The viewer wants to take 
a distance rather than a closer look. Possibly this 
gut reaction changes over time, if one is regu-
larly exposed to gruesome images and one’s 
sensitivity is dulled – a point discussed by Susan 
 habe jeder Einzelne eine Reporterpflicht 
gegenüber der Welt. Was denkt ein Mensch, 
der Verletzte filmt, statt ihnen zu helfen? Und 
was fühle ich, wenn ich mir das anschaue? 
Vielleicht will er, unverhofft ins Chaos 
geraten, seiner unfreiwilligen Zeugenschaft 
einen Sinn verleihen. Er wechselt in jenem 
Moment, in dem er sein Smartphone zückt, 
von der Passivität des Beobachters zur 
Aktivität des Chronisten. Er, der Produzent, 
steht zwischen Leichentüchern und Blut. 
Ich, der Konsument, sitze im Wohnzimmer. 
Uns verbindet die Hoffnung, das Grauen 
sei mit Bildern zu zähmen. Als könne eine 
Gemeinschaft des Hinsehens weiteres Unheil 
abwenden. Unsere Vorstellung vom Bösen 
ist traditionell mit der Dunkelheit verknüpft. 
Mit den düsteren, unbeobachteten Ecken. Mit 
der Nacht. Wir glauben, das Grauenhafte sei 
zu vertreiben mit Wachsamkeit. Terroristen 
greifen uns aber nicht an, weil wir weggucken. 
Sie greifen uns an, weil wir hinsehen. Unser 
Reflex, die Tat zu filmen und zu verbreiten, ist 
Teil ihres Plans. 
Sontag in Regarding the Pain of Others (2003). 
In themselves, images of horror are unlikely to 
prompt critical reflection and civil courage; yet 
they can do so if compared to reverse images 
that contain an implicit norm of what humanity 
should look like. 
Orienting images of humanity:  
the example of Michelangelo’s  
Creation of Adam
As an orienting image of humanity, the biblical 
imago Dei motif and its rendition in visual art, 
in particular by Renaissance artists, is central 
and has proved influential in European cultural 
history down to the present day. The image of 
the near-touching hands of God and Adam on 
the fresco painting Creazione di Adamo (Creation 
of Adam, 1512) by Michelangelo Buonarroti on 
 Terror ist ein Akt des Exhibitionismus. …  
Ich dachte, ich hätte Kontrolle über die Bilder. 
Dank Internet und digitaler Revolution. In  
Wahrheit aber haben die Bilder längst 
Kontrolle über mich. Ich träume von ihnen. 
Sie tauchen auf, wenn ich einen weißen 
Lastwagen sehe. Oder eine schwarze Fahne. 
Ich will nicht mehr. … Welchen Sinn soll 
es haben, dass ich diese Bilder in meinem 
Kopf lasse, von enthaupteten, gesprengten 
und überfahrenen Menschen? Es gibt Leute, 
die fordern, wir müssten hinsehen. … Doch 
bloße Augenzeugenschaft hilft niemandem. 
Und Entsetzen behindert manchmal das 
Verstehen. … Vielleicht ist es Zeit für die 
Wiederentdeckung eines alten Gefühls. 
Wir haben uns im Laufe des menschlichen 
Fort schritts, aus guten Gründen, von ihm 
entfernt: der Scham. Sie könnte uns in 
Zeiten der Terrorbilder, der schonungslosen 
Unmittelbarkeit, Sensibilität verleihen für 
die Frage, wann wir hinschauen dürfen. Und 
wann wir besser wegschauen. Wenn wir 
der Grausamkeit begegnen, dann ist es in 
Ordnung, mal den Blick zu senken. Wir sind 
schließlich beschämt. Beschämt über das, was 
wir Menschen uns antun. Wegschauen – auch 
das ist Mitgefühl.’
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the Sistine Chapel’s ceiling in Rome has become 
‘iconic of humanity’.3 
It illustrates at once the narrative of the cre-
ation of the human being in God’s image (cf. 
Gen. 1:26f.) and of God breathing the breath 
of life into Adam’s nostrils (cf. Gen. 2:7). The 
anthropomorphic portrayal of God suggests, 
on the one hand, that Adam is created in God’s 
likeness; yet on the other hand, God and man do 
not shake hands. Rather, the giver of life reaches 
out to his creature, which all the way through 
remains dependent on him. This is also sug-
gested by another likely source of inspir ation: 
the hymn Veni Creator Spiritus that asks the ‘fin-
ger of the paternal right hand’ (digitus paternae 
dexterae) to give the faithful speech.4 It is import-
ant to note that humanity is here portrayed 
3 See ‘The Creation of Adam’ in Wikipedia 
(accessed on 16.4.2018).
4 See ‘The Creation of Adam’ in Wikipedia, 
note 11 (accessed on 16.4.2018).
vis-à-vis God, and this setting implies a criter-
ion for human agency: the latter is defined as 
the highest standard that demands the greatest 
efforts – otherwise we cannot live up to the con-
versation with our divine counterpart, and our 
likeness to God disappears through our own 
fault.
Michelangelo laboured on the Sistine ceil-
ing between 1508 and 1512. In the centre of the 
ceiling are nine scenes from Genesis that can 
be associated with three great stages in human 
(pre-)history and destiny: ante legem (before the 
law of Moses), sub lege (under the law), sub gratia 
(under grace, cf. Rom. 5–8). The place of honour 
on the ceiling is reserved for the Creation of 
Adam, yet according to Renaissance theology, 
it is in the incarnation of God in Christ that 
human dignity, which was first manifested 
in the creation of Adam, is fully realised and 
restored (see O’Malley 1986: 92, 95f., 116, 124). 
Many Renaissance preachers and humanists 
paraphrased Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s 
Michelangelo Buonarroti, Creazione di Adamo (1512), Sistine Chapel, Rome. Wikimedia Commons.
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Oration on the Dignity of Man (see ibid. 122, 
cf. Seymour 1972: 83f., 132–41). Although the 
theologians at the papal court expended special 
effort in praising man’s spiritual qualities, they 
by no means neglected the beauty and harmony 
they saw in the human body. In a sonnet by 
Michelangelo himself, the theme of humanity 
created in God’s image and likeness recurs, and 
can almost be taken as a commentary on the 
painting (see O’Malley 1986: 124, with refer-
ence to Michelangelo 1960: 60f = no. 106; 1963: 
76 = no. 104):
né Dio sua grazia mi si mostra altrove  
God, in His grace, shows Himself nowhere 
more
più che ’n alcun leggiadro e mortal velo;  
To me, than through some veil, mortal and 
lovely,
e quell sol amo perch’ in lui si specchia  
Which I will only love for being His mirror
The motif of the eternal God appearing 
in the shape of a mortal human being, and of 
human beings becoming theomorphous in sal-
vation corresponds to Athanasius’ phrase that 
‘God became man in order that man might 
become god’ (Oratio de incarnatione verbi, ch. 54, 
192B). Here human deification is seen in rela-
tion to God’s incarnation, the terminus ad quem 
of creation.
Becoming like God as goal description is the 
exact opposite of the bestiality of crimes against 
humanity where human beings act more bes-
tially and brutishly than any animal could do. 
While Michelangelo’s painting on the ceiling 
requires us to look up to heaven and to imagine 
our origin in God’s life-giving creativity, atroc-
ities committed by people who have ‘sunk’ so 
low make us cast down the eyes in shame over 
such a degradation of the human species. The 
movements upwards or downwards are diamet-
rically opposed to each other, just as the humane 
or inhumane treatment of other human beings 
corresponds to antithetical options.
According to Alexander Nagel, the right arm 
and the legs of Adam in Michelangelo’s painting 
resemble his thematically related investigations 
into the process by which an inanimate body 
comes to life: 
the figure of Adam is an exquisite balance 
between agency and dependency. He is not 
simply a passive body lifted up from the 
ground by God …. Instead Adam is shown 
receiving and yet reaching, languid and yet 
instinct with an incipient autonomy. His 
upraised knee, like that of Lazarus, is a pri-
mary indicator of his stirring into life. (Nagel 
2000: 153f.)
In prolongation of the Genesis scenes re -
counted by Michelangelo – the cosmogony, 
the origins of humanity, original sin and the 
fatal burst of evil in the story (the Flood and the 
Drunkenness of Noah) – is The Last Judgment, a 
depiction of the second coming of Christ and 
the raising of the dead who either ascend to 
heaven or descend to hell. May we conclude 
that God, despite this open ending of history, 
does not abandon us, but will, in the end, ensure 
justice? 
As Antonio Paolucci (2010: 16) explains 
in regard to the Creation of Adam, ‘God arrives 
in a glorious swirl magnified by his red cloak, 
engulfing the angels of his retinue as if they were 
protected by a wind-swollen sail, a personifica-
tion of the Almighty’s power’. Michelangelo 
seems to have trusted in the possibility that God 
finally overcomes evil, punishes the perpetrators 
and rewards those who suffered for the sake of 
the good, for instance the martyrs. This eschato-
logical perspective reacts upon the view of the 
human condition here and now: our choices of 
good or evil matter infinitely. Michelangelo’s 
paintings are reminders of the idea that our 
comportment on earth will also determine our 
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afterlife. This way, visual images of (in)human-
ity contain a (more or less obvious or hidden) 
normativity. They call attention to the gravity 
of life-determining decisions whose effects we 
ourselves will have to bear. This might in itself 
work as an antidote to moral indifference.
In Michelangelo’s creation fresco, God and 
Adam do not communicate at eye level, but 
God nonetheless makes eye contact with man. 
According to the Bible, God creates with the 
help of his creative word: ‘Let us make man-
kind in our image, in our likeness’ (Gen. 1:26). 
Traditionally, human likeness to God has also 
been located in the ability to speak, whereas 
violence entails the brutalisation of language. 
This brings us to the next point: images of 
(in)humanity in literature.
Verbal and mental images of (in)humanity: 
Semprun
While the refusal to look at visual images of 
inhumanity is comprehensible, the question 
is whether verbal images, that is, metaphors 
with pictorial content or linguistic expressions, 
which clothe thoughts in words and symbolise 
(in)humanity, can be bypassed. Or do such 
images prove necessary in order to identify the 
horror of atrocities, to rhetorically condemn 
inhumanity, and to cope with its consequences?
The Holocaust survivor Jorge Semprun had 
a good reason to postpone his testimony for 
about five decades. In his book L’écriture ou la 
vie (Literature or Life, 1994), he reflects upon the 
problem of evil and renders a conversation with 
an American lieutenant after the liberation of 
the concentration camp of Buchenwald in April 
1945:
‘What’s essential,’ I tell Lieutenant Rosenfeld, 
‘is the experience of Evil. Of course, you can 
experience that anywhere. … You don’t need 
concentration camps to know Evil. But here, 
this experience will turn out to have been 
crucial, and massive, invading everywhere, 
devouring everything. … It’s the experience of 
radical Evil.’ 
Startled, he looks at me sharply. Das radikal 
Böse! Obviously, he has caught the reference 
to Kant. … I tell the American lieutenant that 
I should have begun this account with … the 
stifling and fraternal stink of Sundays spent 
with Halbwachs and Maspero [who were 
dying]. 
‘Evil is not what is inhuman, of course. … 
Or else it’s what is inhuman in man. … The 
inhuman ity of man, considered as vital pos-
sibility, as personal intention. … As freedom. 
… So it’s ridiculous to oppose Evil, to distance 
oneself from it, through a simple reference to 
what is human, to mankind. … Evil is one of 
the possible designs of the freedom essen-
tial to the humanity of man – the freedom 
from which spring both the humanity and 
inhuman ity of man.’ (Semprum 1997: 88)
 
In other words, inhumanity is understood 
as human nature turning against itself – as an 
option that presupposes the freedom of man 
who, as a human being, can comport in an in -
human manner. Semprun later makes it explicit 
that ‘In Buchenwald, the SS, the Kapos, the 
informers, the sadistic torturers all belonged 
to the human race just as much as the best and 
purest among us, among the victims’ (1997: 
164). In order to come to terms with the non-
sense of torture and sadism, Semprun needs the 
paradoxical notion of humanity comprising the 
possibility of inhumanity in itself. The root of 
radical evil is, on this view, inherent in human 
freedom, which is double-edged.
Now, while the linguistic description of the 
problem of evil and its root in human beings can 
clarify the ambiguities, if not the abyss of the 
conditio humana, verbal images of (in)humanity 
have, in Semprun’s case, not been able to help 
him to cope with the horror of atrocities. On 
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the contrary. As the book title Literature or Life 
suggests, he was confronted with an alterna-
tive: either writing about evil (which made him 
relive its horrors and pulled him down) or liv-
ing his life with the help of a cure of ‘studied 
amnesia’ and ‘aphasia’ (Semprun 1997: 180, 196). 
Semprun’s experience corresponds to the one of 
many other traumatised survivors (cf. Welz 2017 
with reference to, e.g., Aharon Appelfeld, Otto 
Dov Kulka, Elie Wiesel, Sarah Kofman, and 
Dori Laub’s research). 
It follows that evil cannot be overcome just 
by telling about it – just as little as it can be over-
come by means of photos5 or films documenting 
cruelty and its depressing results: suffering, death 
and destruction. Even though visual and verbal 
images of (in)humanity do not seem to have any 
therapeutic value, they may nonetheless provide 
Orientierung im Denken, that is, they can orient 
thinking. In his 1786 treatise Was heißt: Sich 
im Denken orientiren? Kant describes orienting 
oneself in and by thinking as a premise of reason 
that is withdrawn from its critique, enabling us 
to accept something as true. Remarkably, reason 
5 However, photographic depiction can 
fulfil an important epistemic function. The 
so-called ‘Sonderkommando photographs’ 
(see Stone 2001), for instance, which were 
taken by in mates of the death camp Birkenau, 
are probably the only visual records of the 
Holo caust as it happened. They are not 
recollections or reconstructions after the 
fact; rather, their closeness to the actuality 
of genocide constitutes ‘irrefutable evidence’ 
(ibid. 133). They have a ‘visceral impact’ on 
the shocked viewer (ibid. 140). Yet they also 
emphasise a certain distance from the events. 
Stone (ibid. 142) quotes Susan Sontag (1979: 
109f.) in order to elucidate their double effect: 
‘photographs can and do distress. But the 
aestheticizing tendency of photography is 
such that the medium which conveys distress 
ends by neutralising it. … Photography’s 
realism creates a confusion about the real 
which is (in the long run) analgesic morally as 
well as (both in the long and in the short run) 
sensorially stimulating.’
thereby ‘feels’ its own need, its being in need of 
orientation, and acknowledges its own limits 
(see Stegmaier 2008: 88f., 93).
Since we cannot think, speak or write about 
anything without having an ‘idea’ of what we 
are talking about, metaphors depend on men-
tal images (or representations) in our mind: 
memories, dreams or intuitions. Do we, then, 
have to draw the same pessimistic conclusion 
regarding mental images as we did regarding 
visual and verbal images of (in)humanity? The 
case is complicated because mental images can 
only be communicated by being mediated. This 
implies that mental images can only appear 
together with other types of images. Semprun, 
for instance, tells us about the co-appearance 
of filmed (visual) and remembered (mental) 
images.
In the cinema in Locarno, he saw a news-
reel on the discovery of the Nazi concentration 
camps by the Allied armies, where the camera’s 
eye explored the interior of a hut: ‘skeletal depor-
tees at the end of their strength lay collapsed in 
bunks, staring fixedly at the intruders who were 
bringing – too late for many of them – their 
freedom’; moreover, the camera’s eye watched 
the American army’s bulldozers ‘pushing hun-
dreds of wasted corpses into common graves’ 
(Semprun 1997: 198). Semprun knew that these 
scenes had been filmed in different camps liber-
ated by the Allied advance a few months before. 
And here is the account of the impact that these 
scenes have had on him:
There were also some images of Buchenwald, 
which I recognized. … Or rather: I had experi-
enced them. It was the difference between the 
seen and the experienced that was disturbing. 
Because it was the first time I’d seen such 
images. Until that winter’s day – somewhat 
by chance, much more through a spontaneous 
strategy of self-defense – I’d managed to avoid 
filmed images of the Nazi camps. I had the 
ones in my memory, images that sometimes 
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burst cruelly into my consciousness. Images I 
could also summon deliberately, even giving 
them a more or less structured form, organiz-
ing them into a course of anamnesis, a kind of 
narrative or intimate exorcism. That’s exactly 
what they were: intimate images. … All of 
a sudden, though, in the quiet of that movie 
theater in Locarno, where the whispers and 
murmurs died away into a rigid silence of 
horror and compassion (and disgust, probably), 
these intimate images became foreign to me, 
objectified up on the screen. They also broke 
free to my personal procedures of memory and 
censorship. They ceased being my property 
and my torment, the deadly riches of my life. 
They were, finally, nothing more than the 
externalized, radical reality of Evil: its chilling 
yet searing reflection. …
I saw myself returned to the truth of an indis-
putable experience. Everything had been true, 
so, it was all still true. Nothing had been a 
dream. In becoming, thanks to the film corps 
of the Allied armies, a spectator of my own 
life, a voyeur of my own experience, I felt as if 
I were escaping the wrenching uncertainties 
of memory. … I had not imagined Buchen-
wald. … Yet although the newsreel footage 
confirmed the truth of the actual experience 
(which was sometimes difficult for me to 
grasp and situate among my memories), at the 
same time these images underlined the exas-
perating difficulty of transmitting this truth, 
of making it, if not absolutely clear, at least 
communicable. (Semprun 1997: 199f.)
On the one hand, the newsreel corroborated 
and validated Semprun’s personal experience; on 
the other hand, the film images in themselves 
were not sufficient to understand what had hap-
pened. For Semprun these images were ‘silent’ 
– not merely because they were filmed without 
sound recording, but ‘above all because they said 
nothing precise about the reality they showed, 
because they delivered only confused scraps of 
meaning’; what was missing but ‘really needed 
was commentary on the images, to decipher 
them, to situate them not only in a historical 
context but within a continuity of emotions’ 
(Semprun 1997: 201). While visual images have 
the capacity to externalise reality, so that we can 
distance ourselves from it, they do not in the 
same instance interpret the events they show. 
They need a beholder who can see and under-
stand them as something from a certain perspec-
tive – and this can only be done on the basis 
of mental images that are brought into a certain 
order or structure with the help of thinking.
While the flashbacks of traumatised mem-
ory pop up involuntarily and thereby intensify 
the victim’s feeling of helplessness and power-
lessness, the activity of thinking can, at least to 
some extent, serve as a coping strategy. At its 
best, it can master the impressions and sen-
sations linked to situations of overwhelming 
cruelty. Such situations’ after-effects on those 
involved can be identified and worked through 
with the help of the faculty of imagination, 
which not only (re-)presents certain memories, 
but also transforms them by embedding these 
mental images in a broader context and by con-
stantly updating the parameters framing it. 
This discovery dovetails nicely with Arendt’s 
defence of thinking – provided that one thinks 
also from another’s point of view and remem-
bers what one has done, thereby remaining in 
dialogue with oneself and integrating the past, 
the present and the future. 
Imagination in the service of the good
Therefore, my preliminary conclusion is that 
visual, verbal and mental images in themselves 
are not enough to yield navigational tools and 
norms of orientation; yet the faculty that con-
nects them and allows us to relate freely to these 
images, namely imagination as guided by critical 
thinking, can do so.
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Let me give a recent example from Danish 
history. In the night between 14 and 15 February 
2015, Dan Uzan was on voluntary guard duty in 
front of the synagogue at the Jewish Community 
in Copenhagen. Inside the community house a 
Bat Mitzvah celebration was taking place. A ter-
rorist shot him. On a website established by his 
family, one can read the following lines: 
Daring to be kind
Evil can never be vanquished through force, 
it can be overcome through human kindness 
[Danish: godhed; lit. ‘goodness’] alone. It is 
the only hope for mankind and for our world 
entire.6
On 28 September 2016, there was a remark-
able heading in the Danish news on the inter-
net: ‘Far til terroroffer: Dan skal hævnes med 
godhed’ (‘The father of the terror victim: Dan 
shall be avenged with goodness’) (Christensen 
and Korsgaard 2016). Only the good is stronger 
than evil. Only the good can break the vicious 
circle of evil that engenders even more evil, if 
reciprocated and paid back like with like.
Again: visual, verbal or mental images of 
(in)humanity alone cannot do this job. What is 
needed is a human being who freely relates to 
these images and puts him- or herself in the ser-
vice of goodness rather than evil. Yet this con-
clusion does not help us to face the problem of 
evil, let alone to ‘solve’ it. If evil is not located in 
images, from which we can distance ourselves, 
but rather in the beholder of these images or in 
the mind of the one who remembers them, evil 
is so close to us that we cannot run away from it. 
We take the problem with us. I agree with Kant 
and Semprun: human freedom is ambiguous. 
While the problem of evil cannot be reduced 
to personal agents, the agency of human individ-
uals contributes to it, not least in a Bildereignis, 
6 See Dan Uzans Mindefond (accessed 
16.4.2018).
the event in which an image is seen by some-
one in a certain respect. Of course, images are 
not just tools that can be used for some agenda, 
but act upon us as well; we are affected even by 
the images that we ourselves have created. How, 
then, can we surpass our own acts of imagin-
ation and, in a way, see more than we can 
imagine – becoming surprised by yet unrealised 
possibilities? The life story and remembrance 
of Dan Uzan suggests that neither idolatry nor 
iconoclasm is the right way forward, but rather 
a human being’s exemplary performance, which 
turns this person into a living image of the kind-
ness he embodies. It is this image, which still 
lives on among us even after his death. 
Conclusion and prospect
Let us recapitulate the line of reasoning so far. 
A comparative reading of Kant’s and Arendt’s 
interpretations of the problem of evil has shown 
various strengths and deficiencies in their respec-
tive theoretical frameworks. Kant’s idea that evil 
is the matter of a misguided choice falls short in 
cases such as Eichmann’s where evil results from 
indifference, while Arendt neglects the fact that, 
seen from the perspective of the victim, evil is 
never banal, and that leading historic al figures 
like Hitler were not free from wicked intentions 
and strategies to implement them. Arendt’s 
narrow focus on intellectual judgement and 
thoughtfulness as a barrier against thoughtlessly 
and carelessly committed evil was then broad-
ened by discussing the ethical re-orientation 
through visual, verbal and mental images of 
(in)humanity.
The Hebrew word ‘Adam’  is not only a 
proper name, but also a generic noun that desig-
nates the ‘human being’. In this line, Michel-
angelo’s painting The Creation of Adam was pre-
sented as a reminder of a biblical vision of the 
origin and goal of humankind. The image con-
tains an implicit norm of humanity, and, as such, 
it contrasts with images of atrocities denying 
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human dignity. The question is how we can 
regain the status quo ante the Fall, if this is possi-
ble at all. If paradise is lost irretrievably, there is 
only one way: forwards, into the future. Yet can 
we improve ourselves, enhance our nature? On 
the basis of Semprun’s reflections on the ambi-
guity of human freedom making itself unfree 
in evil-doing, I doubt the legitimacy of such an 
overly optimistic outlook. If we soberly accept 
human imperfection as the context of discovery 
where God’s image can shine through, we might 
have to reconsider the real-life appearance of the 
imago Dei as a broken and incomplete image.
The image of an invisible God becomes 
‘visible’ or accessible to human experience 
only if divine transcendence is mediated by a 
‘vision’ with ‘the mind’s eye’. The spiritual needs 
embodiment in order to appear at all. This can 
happen in the following ways (cf. Welz 2016: ch. 
6 and Conclusion): (1) The ‘vision’ of the image 
of God can arise through the figurative fea-
tures of language, which include a reference to 
something that exceeds the realm of our experi-
ence. The imago Dei can be conceptualised as 
a communicative image insofar as we speak in 
response to God’s word, which has called us into 
life. Humanity in God’s image comes to the fore 
by virtue of verbal images: metaphors showing 
the similar in the dissimilar. (2) Colin McGinn 
(2004: 3) defines ‘mindsight’ as an imaginative 
seeing-as, where the dichotomy between per-
ception and conception collapses in the hybrid 
of a vision that is both bodily and mental. Thus, 
visual images, too, play a role in understanding 
oneself and others as visible images of an invis-
ible God. Divine–human co-presence in the 
imago Dei involves a looking-for-each-other, 
which, for instance, can be made intelligible on 
the analogy of an exchange of glances where 
our sight is summoned and subverted, so that 
the one who looks also feels looked at. (3) Last 
but not least, the imago Dei becomes visible with 
the help of mental images of an invisible God. 
‘Inner’ images differ from ordinary perception 
in arising even without stimuli ‘from outside’. 
Memory, language, and the power of imagina-
tion enable us to envision, to recall, and to artic-
ulate the invisible. 
If one takes the preposition in the Hebrew 
phrase םיִהֺלֱא םֶלֶצְבּ (b’tselem Elohim, Gen. 1:27) as 
bet essentiae, then human beings are created as 
God’s images; if one takes it as bet normae, then 
human beings are created in or according to the 
image of God. As living, speaking, embodied 
images that are created in or according to the 
image of God, we realise that we can either 
reveal or conceal God’s presence, and thus dis-
play or overshadow our likeness to God. Hence, 
the image of the divine in the human is still 
awaiting its future fulfilment. As a normative 
limit-concept, the imago Dei cannot be grasped, 
but only approximated. Its liminality comes to 
the fore in metaphors instilling a sense of 
possibil ity in language. Metaphors are like 
‘organs’ for the new and foreign, for the not-yet-
seen that can still be formed and re-formed (cf. 
Bjerg 1999: 187, 189, 191). In this sense, the 
imago Dei is an intuited image of what we are to 
become.
The move from the imago Dei to the imita-
tio Dei, from an image ‘seen’ only in theory to 
the ethical praxis of imitation, can only be com-
pleted in linguistic communion with the One in 
whose image we are created and the ones who 
are our fellow creatures. This is a move beyond 
images, which ultimately leads us from vision to 
audition, from seeing to listening. 
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